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Abstract 
This article examines the nature of price formation and transmission in the Tanzanian coffee 
price chain. To date, research on the real-world processes of price formation have been scant 
in economic geography and extant literatures.  This article addresses this by focusing on price 
formation in geographically distant but connected markets, and the interaction between global 
and local price dynamics. The article employs a new framework that builds on chain and 
network approaches by integrating concepts from marketization and institutional approaches.  
The study finds that the world price of coffee has become increasingly volatile as a result of 
the behavior of international coffee traders and broader shifts in the character of global 
capital accumulation. It also demonstrates the varying role domestic marketing and local-
level institutions play in shaping price formation and cushioning Tanzanian producers from 
sudden price changes. Finally, the study highlights the role prices, via these local-level 
institutions, play in extenuating differentiation between producers, creating winners and 
losers.  
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A one-pound bag of whole bean coffee from Starbucks under the name of Komodo 
Dragon Blend, a blend of Asia Pacific coffee beans with Papua New Guinea 
prominently mentioned on the label, costs $12.29. . . . Growers in Maimafu
2
 
received $0.33 for a pound of their coffee on 8 August…On the same day 
exporters in Goroka were paid between $1.00 and $1.41 per pound, depending 
upon the coffee’s certification . . . of the $12.95 paid for a pound of fair-trade or 
organic beans, only $1.41 stays in Papua New Guinea. The rest of that price, 
$11.54, goes somewhere else. (West 2012, 16–17) 
The above quote from West (2012) exemplifies a narrative of scholars and activists, 
for example in the fair trade movement of the 1990s and 2000s, interested in exposing the 
unequal trade relations and distribution of income along supply chains that connect producers 
in the Global South to consumers in the Global North. At the same time, global value chain  
and related variant approaches (hereafter referred to collectively as chain approaches/studies) 
rose in prominence in development studies and economic geography literatures as providing 
insights into the opportunities and challenges for developing country firms and actors 
integrated into global supply chains and production networks. Such approaches have 
subsequently been taken up by nongovernmental organizations and international development 
organizations, including the World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), and United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), as blueprints for development 
under contemporary global economic conditions and organization,
3
 appearing as an unlikely 
confluence between more mainstream economic approaches, preoccupied with market 
integration as an end and in itself, and more critical chain studies grounded in world systems 
                                                          
2 Maimfu is the site of West’s (2012) research, and Goroko is its nearest marketing center. 
3 Seven UN agencies joined together in 2010 to create the United Nations Value Chain Development Group in an initiative 
that highlights the broadening appeal of value chain approaches in development practice (Neilson, Pritchard, and Yeung 
2014). 
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theory and the global production network approach in contemporary economic geography 
(Bair 2009; Neilson, Pritchard, and Yeung 2014; Coe and Yeung 2015). 
Chain approaches in economic geography applied to issues of development and 
North–South economic relations have drawn from mainstream economic theory, institutional 
approaches, and new economic sociology. As such, they have provided great insights into 
new forms of industrial organization and the potential implications for development. 
However, detailed investigations on the real-world processes of price formation have been 
scant (Beckert 2011). 
That detailed investigation of price formation in chain studies appears somewhat of a 
surprise given the significance and criticality of prices both in the coordination of economic 
activities and the distribution of wealth as well as prices as the outcome of the forces that 
structure market exchange. In this latter sense, prices “are anchored in institutional 
regulation, in the social structure of markets and in meaning” (ibid., 759) rather than the 
aggregate outcome of individual supply and demand interactions. This is not to say that the 
issues of prices have been entirely absent from chain studies; rather, they appear as crucial 
conditioning influences on the organization of production as opposed to an objects of study in 
their own right. 
This article thus aims to contribute to extant debates and dialogues in economic 
geography more generally, and complements and develops existing chain approaches in 
particular, by introducing the study of price formation. Using the example of coffee chains 
originating in Tanzania, this study seeks to advance our understanding of how prices are 
formed along supply chains that span multiple national boundaries and their implications for 
value distribution along chains and the extent to, and ways in which, unequal North–South 
economic relations are reproduced or challenged. 
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Tanzania is particularly fascinating case study for a number of reasons. Coffee is an 
important income source for the economy as a whole as well as for individual producers and 
their families. Despite accounting for less than 1% of gross domestic product in 2010 
(International Coffee Organization [ICO] 2015a), the coffee sector averages US$ 100 million 
in export earnings per annum, and over 2.4 million individuals in Tanzania depend on coffee 
for their livelihoods in some way (Tanzania Coffee Board 2012). Coffee marketing and trade 
have undergone numerous changes, permitting an investigation of multiple marketing 
systems in parallel and allowing for an examination of the relational dynamics between and 
in new and old institutional structures. In Tanzania, coffee is produced in the north around the 
foothills of Mount Kilimanjaro (predominantly Arabica coffee) and in the south 
(predominantly Robusta coffee). This study focuses on the production of Arabica coffee in 
the Kilimanjaro region. The position of Kilimanjaro’s coffee producers as price takers in the 
international coffee market allows us to investigate price relationships originating at the 
global level down to the local level in the field.   
This study brings together in-depth research of how actual prices come into existence 
on the ground and how prices are formed and transmitted by different actors in Tanzania and 
at the level of domestic and international trade. The institutional aspects we consider as loci 
of such global–local links include the cooperative unions and appended institutions such as 
village primary societies.
4
 We will also consider the roles of the central coffee auction and 
the New York derivatives markets in forming and transmitting prices along the chain.  
The article is organized as follows. The next section discusses approaches to the 
theory of price formation from mainstream economics, contemporary economic sociology, 
and economic geography before sketching out in the section that follows this study’s 
                                                          
4 Primary societies are voluntary groupings of coffee farmers, based around their village or locality and are aimed at 
assisting producers with the production and marketing of their coffee. These societies were originally introduced as a central 
part of the cooperative marketing system. Today, however, the functions and membership numbers of primary societies in 
Tanzania are not uniform.  
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approach to the study of price formation in spatially separated but connected markets along 
commodity supply chains. The third section presents the results from this investigation of 
price formation along the price chain from coffee futures markets to the farm-gate in the 
Kilimanjaro region of Tanzania. The penultimate section provides a discussion on the 
development implications of pricing mechanisms and modalities in coffee markets today and 
a calls for more detailed investigations of how real-world markets operate, and more detailed 
studies of processes of price formation for other commodities and in other countries. The 
final section provides conclusions on price formation and development. 
Approaches to the Study of Markets and Price Formation along 
Commodity Chains 
This section presents the various ways in which the state of the art has analyzed and 
dealt with prices in commodity markets. Three differing approaches are presented from very 
different scholarly and methodological origins. The three approaches can be classified as (1) 
the mainstream economics approach, (2) chain and network approaches, and (3) the 
institutional approach. By discussing these different approaches and their attempts at the 
study of prices in commodity markets, it will become clear where this particular study is able 
to fill gaps by crossing the currently distinct boundaries of theory and method.    
Mainstream Economic Approaches to Prices along Commodity Chains 
At the core to mainstream economic approaches to the study of prices is the 
neoclassical theory of price determination where price results from the coming together of 
supply (as the aggregation of individual firms’ output informed by the dictum of profit 
maximization) and demand (as the aggregation of individuals’ demand determined by given 
and static preferences) through market competition. Given the critical coordinating function 
of prices as providing “crucial points of orientation for actors in market exchange that make 
heterogeneous objects and services commensurable” (Beckert 2011, 759) and the centrality of 
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market exchange in mainstream economics, it follows that the translation of theory into both 
policy practice and empirical research on supply chains focus exclusively on market 
integration in order to unleash the forces of economic restructuring according to the 
comparative advantage of each country, and price transmission, respectively. If unabated by 
market imperfections, competitive markets are understood to guarantee an efficient allocation 
of resources and in turn implies that factor and product prices in spatially separated markets 
will differ only by transport and storage costs. Given that the definition of market integration 
implied by the standard spatial equilibrium model links directly to price outcomes, co-
integration analysis—the times series econometrics method that allows the investigation of 
long-run equilibrium statistical relationships between variables—has become the most 
prominent analytical tool employed in empirical studies on market integration. In addition, 
co-integration analysis and its associated error correction models are presumed to allow the 
researcher to test certain features such as completeness, speed, and asymmetries in the 
relationship between prices.  Here, focus has been on the extent and statistical nature of price 
transmission along supply chains (e.g., Abdulai 2000; Krivonos 2004; Rapsomanikis, 
Hallam, and Conforti 2006; Cudjoe, Breisinger, and Diao 2010). 
While error correction models may provide forecasts for spot price developments in 
the near and medium term, they present a number of analytical, and technical, limitations that 
prevent their legitimate use as a model of price formation in commodity markets.  First, this 
abstract view of markets disembedded from their institutional contexts and social, cultural, 
and political processes that make up real-world interactions constituting a market and shaping 
market outcomes can  tell us little about the mechanisms by which prices are formed or the 
role that they play in processes of production and exchange. Second, the mainstream 
economic approach is unable to explain spatial variations in prices except in terms of market 
imperfections and lack of market integration that divorce localized supply and demand 
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dynamics from regional or global market conditions. Third, greater price pass-through from 
world markets to prices received by primary producers in and of themselves cannot be taken 
as supportive of development processes. Fourth, supply and demand models conceive of 
markets as horizontal supply and demand relations and neglect the vertical structure of 
commodity supply chains. The above concerns with the mainstream economic approaches are 
highlighted by the theoretical approach discussed below and in Figure 1, where the standard 
economic approach takes into account column B only.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Chain and Network Approaches to Price Formation and Transmission 
Born out of a critique of disembeddedness of mainstream economics’ market 
abstraction, network approaches to the study of markets (and price formation) emerged from 
economic sociology and focused on the social embeddedness of economic action, namely, as 
“embedded in ongoing networks of personal relationships rather than being carried out by 
atomized actors” (Granovetter and Swedberg 1992, 9) Network approaches to the study of 
price formation thus investigates power, trust, and status differentiation as mechanisms 
through which networks, and network position, become relevant for market prices (Beckert 
2011).  
 In network approaches, price is the outcome of how relationships are structured in the 
market field and how network position influences costs with power, trust, and status 
differences between actors as key factors in the formation of price (ibid.). Furthermore, price-
based competition along supply chains and the ways in which differentiated chain actors are 
able to create spaces for price negotiation and organizational forms to shield them from price-
based competition remain critical for development outcomes and therefore deserve greater 
attention than is currently afforded in chain studies (Ouma 2012). 
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While network or relational approaches to the study of markets have been prevalent in 
recent economic geography literatures, there has been very little attention on price formation 
in networked markets. In relation to agrofood chains, Ouma (ibid.) adopts a relational–
constructionist approach that draws heavily from relational approaches while emphasizing 
certain insights from the marketization approach, namely, the necessity of studying 
materialities of market making (discussed below). A firm’s survival is dependent on 
achieving relational stability: stable “socio-material relations vis-à-vis worker, suppliers, 
buyers, consumers, and the state” (Ouma 2012, 323). While not focussing on processes of 
price formation, Ouma (2012) showed how the maintenance of relational stability was key to 
shielding certain actors from price competition, on the one hand, and how price competition 
can destroy and undermine relational stability in the case of Tongo Fruits (a Ghanaian 
agrobusiness firm specialising in the cutting and packing of fruits fresh from harvest in the 
country of origin), on the other hand.  
Rather than a clear break from network approaches of new economic sociology, 
marketization, as a subset, or one modality, of economization, retains much of the language 
and analytical devices of network theorists while orientating the focus of study on to 
materialities: “the socio-technical assemblages and things that circulate from hand to hand” 
(Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 384). Rather than focus on networks and social relations, 
institutions, rules, conventions, norms, and power struggles in the social construction of 
markets, marketization theorists view the construction of markets as sociotechnical and 
regard technical devices of market making such as “techniques, sciences, standards, 
calculating instruments, metrology and, more generally, material infrastructure in market 
formation” (ibid). 
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Çalışkan and Callon (2010) lay out a research program for the study of markets and 
propose prices as one of five vantage points from which to examine marketization.
5
 Here, 
price setting is a political process in which prices are the outcome of struggles between 
actors, each attempting to impose their mechanism for determining the value and quality of a 
good. What Çalışkan and Callon (ibid.) add to the notion of prices as the outcome of political 
struggle in classical sociology (Weber 1978) is that calculation tools are differentially 
mobilized by agents to estimate quantifications. Prices are therefore “at the heart of agents’ 
struggles to produce asymmetries in the distribution of value” (Çalışkan and Callon 2010, 
17). More powerful actors are able to impose their method of valuation on others and thus 
affect the distribution of value.  
Çalışkan (2010) provides a rare example of the study of price formation, or what he 
refers to as price realization, along agrocommodity supply chains that applies a marketization 
approach. His analysis traces the agents along the chain and analyzes their interactions as 
they make use of technical devices according to differentiated positions of power in the 
negotiation of prices, how different narratives of the market are normalized into the everyday 
discourses and actions, and how conventions are maintained through performance and 
practice in the encounters between traders in what Çalışkan refers to as rehearsals. In the 
context of cotton price realization, these technical devices include influential market reports, 
price indices (the Cotlook A and B indices, the adjusted world price calculated by the US 
Department of Agriculture), and the price of derivatives contracts on the New York Board of 
Trade
6
 (NYBOT). Moreover, Çalişkan shows that cotton prices, in some instances, depending 
on the structure of local marketing systems, can be shaped politically owing to the 
uncertainty of future supply and thus price. In this way, Çalişkan shows how cotton futures 
                                                          
5 The other four vantage points consist of the things in the market, agencies, encounters, and market maintenance. 
6 The NYBOT was renamed ICE Futures US in September 2007. 
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prices influence the price at which cotton is exchanged without necessarily reflecting supply 
and demand of physical cotton. 
To date, the application of network and marketization approaches to the study of 
markets has left in the background, how networks and agencies, and therefore economic 
action, are specified by, and embedded in, their institutional context, and ignore the 
longevity, or resistance to change, of institutions themselves (Hess 2004; Sunley 2008). In the 
context of Figure 1, such approaches are dealing with segments B and C of the chain, and 
investigate the arrows between some of the price points. Most tackle the middle section of 
this figure, not necessarily concerned by the macroinstitutional factors (covered in segment 
A) in shaping price formation. Neither do such approaches tend to investigate price 
transmission or formation at the very top and bottom ends of the chain.  
This is evident in Çalışkan’s (2010) detailed study of cotton price formation that 
makes no mention of broader determinants of commodity prices and cycles, the financial 
crisis of 2007–2008, and its impact on commodity prices or the systemic origins of the rise in 
prominence of the New York futures price in price negotiations. In light of these deficiencies, 
Sunley calls for an analytical approach that set connections and relations “within an 
evolutional and historic institutionalism and understand how forms of economic relations are 
inseparable from other institutional practices and institutional positions” (2008, 19). 
By employing an analytical approach discussed below and outlined in Figure 1, this 
study hopes to deepen existing network approaches by both discussing price formation and 
transmission at the very top and bottom of the price chain but also by bringing in the 
macroinstitutional factors that have a tendency to be left in the background of most chain and 
network approaches.  
Institutions and Price Formation 
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In spite of its historic significance in economic sociology, for example, in the work of 
Durkheim (1947, 1992), Weber (1978), and Polanyi (1992), there has been little work on the 
influence of institutional regulation on economic outcomes, including prices, since the first 
half of the twentieth century (Beckert 2011). On the one hand, specific institutions matter in 
their impact on prices, and, on the other hand, mechanisms and processes of price formation 
are themselves underpinned by institutions that do not emerge spontaneously. This includes 
the flexible price mechanism. According to Polanyi (1992), “Acts of exchange on the 
personal level produce prices only if they occur under a system of price-making markets, an 
institutional setup which is nowhere created by mere random acts of exchange” (Polanyi 
1992, 36). The regulation of markets is itself a part of the price struggle among actors who try 
to influence the market situation of commodities, “which in turn is determined either by 
tradition, convention, law or voluntary action arising from the interest of actors in the field” 
(Beckert 2011, 767).  
Beckert (2011) identifies five mechanisms and instruments through which 
institutional rules impact on prices. First, regulation that directly alters the supply on markets 
or influence product costs, such as regulation on competition, quality standards, minimum 
wages, regulation of rights of unions to organize, and intellectual property rights, all alter the 
nature of competition, the distribution of market power, and hence the distribution of value 
across different actors. In this way the “market price” “emerges not so much from market 
forces as from institutional structures.” (ibid., 769) Second, regulations on the externalization 
of costs, such as environmental standards and labor safety laws, increase private production 
costs and hence prices. Third, regulatory institutions, such as warranties and other forms of 
consumer protection policies aimed at reducing uncertainties associated with informational 
asymmetries, will affect prices. Fourth, taxation and subsidies used by political actors to 
provide incentives or disincentives for the production or purchase of a specific good will 
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affect prices. Finally, monetary policies that affect the availability and price of credit affect 
price levels.  
Each of the approaches discussed above provides valuable insights into the 
constitution and operation of real-life markets and price formation. They show us that 
competition is regulated via institutional rules that affect distributional outcomes and are 
therefore contested between market participants. Market participants can exert their agency 
differentially depending on their position in networks and exercising of prominent technical 
devices and instruments of price calculation. Networks as relational configurations are 
created, stabilized, or dissolved in processes of contestation and are important explanatory 
factors. However, neither network relations, nor the materialities of market making and 
exchange should be privileged over institutions that differ in terms of their duration and path 
dependency. Nor should institutions be viewed as fixed, since they are themselves political 
and social entities shaped in part through networked relations. The next section details the 
analytical framework developed for this study, which integrates such an appreciation of 
institutions into the study of price formation and transmission. 
An Analytical Framework for a Study of Price Formation and 
Transmission in Commodity Chains  
The analytical framework adopted for this study of coffee prices is motivated by the 
discussion above. Different strands of social science research have analyzed and evaluated 
the formation of prices, the transmission of prices, and the impact of prices and price changes 
to differing degrees and on different actors. However, by dealing in isolation with a particular 
issue from a particular standpoint, factors impacting on prices, beyond the particular 
analytical framework adopted, have frequently been lost. For example, network and 
marketization approaches have been motivated by a desire to study markets and economic 
activities from the ground up in response to critiques of highly abstract supply and demand 
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framework of economic orthodoxy and the tendency toward top-down theorizing in political 
economy. The result has been a preoccupation with the micro in empirical studies to the 
frequent neglect of the macro (Callon 1998; Granovetter 2002; Fine 2005; Sunley 2008; 
Berndt and Boeckler 2012; Ouma 2012).  
Moving forward, we advocate a synthetic approach that adheres to the following 
points: (1) it is cognizant of an appropriate linking between micro and macro in their 
coconstitution; (2) it does not, a priori, prioritize market structure, networks and relational 
stability, institutions or technical devices, but rather analyzes how these different processes 
interact dynamically and differentially across commodities, spaces, and time, under different 
macroeconomic conditions, the changing character of global capital accumulation and 
capitalist restructuring; (3) it permits the analysis of points in the price chains as well as the 
extreme ends of the chain, without assuming that the actors or institutions that make up these 
points in the chain are in any way homogeneous or act in the same way in response to 
external influences. 
Our analytical framework begins with a stylized price chain (see section B in Figure 
1).  Other chain and network approaches to the study of markets have historically proceeded 
by following the thing, the commodity as it is transformed from primary to consumer product 
with the identification of specific processes or nodes that serve as links in the chain. With 
greater recognition that the production and marketing of a good involves complex webs of 
interconnected intra- and extrachain networks, network approaches have advocated a method 
of following the actors beyond the physical commodity chain (Granovetter and Swedberg 
1992; Callon, Méadel, and Rabeharisoa 2002; Henderson et al. 2002). Methodologically, this 
becomes problematic, since the researcher has to make an arbitrary choice in demarcating the 
network of study from the multitudes of network to which it is connected and embedded.  
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We therefore advocate an approach that follows the price chain that complements 
other chain and network approaches to the study of markets. The framing of a price chain, 
following the processes of price formation along commodity chains, allows the researcher to 
systematically select both intra- and extrachain sites and activities of study, connecting the 
macro and micro, the global and the local.  
Using the case of Tanzanian coffee,
7
 Figure 1 demonstrates what a stylized price 
chain looks like and how institutional and relational aspects influence the formation of prices 
and the mediation of prices between points in the chain. Following segment B of the figure 
shows, in simple terms, how world prices influence export prices and, in turn, auction and, 
finally, domestic trading and farm-gate prices downstream. A framework that follows 
segment B alone is associated with the mainstream economics approaches discussed in 
“Mainstream Economic Approaches to prices along Commodity Chains,” above, in which 
price is ultimately the outcome of supply and demand conditions at the world level. This 
approach is severely limited, since it is unable to analyze fully the importance of other factors 
(contained in segments A and C of Figure 1) in shaping pricing outcomes.  
Clearly the configuration of the price chain and the factors shaping pricing outcomes 
depend critically on external institutional factors that determine the price at each point in the 
chain. This is what segment A of Figure 1 details. These aspects are brought into the 
discussion of prices in institutional approaches, discussed in “ Institutions and Price 
Formation” above. However, the missing link from these institutional assessments is a 
broader chain approach. Instead, studies have focused on the role of a particular institutional 
arrangement in, for example, stabilizing or maintaining prices at a single price point. As such, 
this study sheds light on how and why these institutional aspects matter, not just for the 
                                                          
7 The analysis presented here is focused on bulk Arabica coffee, as opposed to speciality or niche coffee, or the usually 
lower-quality Robusta coffee. 
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formation of prices at one particular point, but also for the transmission of prices between 
points.  
Segment C of Figure 1 helps illustrate the importance of recent network and 
marketization approaches to understanding prices, among other things. These relational 
factors highlight how social processes are at the root of understanding relationships, 
including those of price transmission. Despite this crucial addition, most studies are unable to 
complete the vertical price chain using such an approach. Instead they tend to focus on the 
relationship between two points in the chain, analyzing in depth the relations between actors 
and therefore prices as an outcome of such relationships.   
In this study, the price chain acts as a starting point, allowing us to frame our 
empirical research of the real-life processes of price formation in a contemporary coffee 
marketing system: the ways in which they are anchored in institutional regulation and the 
social structure of markets, and the nature of contestation, including the technical and 
relational apparatus deployed.  
Studying Price Transmission along Tanzanian Coffee Chains: Outlining 
Context, Methods, and Applying the Analytical Framework   
Given the proposed approach, this study is necessarily grounded in reality and 
compels us to adopt a case study approach in order to uncover the aspects of price formation 
and transmission currently inadequately explained by the literature. This section provides a 
contextual and analytical framework for this study, by setting out the major themes that 
underpin it. First, the local context in Kilimanjaro will be described, tracing the evolution of 
institutional changes and the historic role of coffee in the local economy. This section will 
also briefly discuss coffee as an international commodity and the changes that have occurred 
at the global level. Finally, this section provides details and justification of our concrete case 
study methods.  
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Kilimanjaro Coffee 
Coffee has been traded since the sixteenth century and is produced in over one 
hundred countries along the equatorial belt. Coffee production is, in many parts of the world, 
linked to the colonial history, from German and British colonial rule in East Africa to Spanish 
and Portuguese colonialism in Latin America. The importance of coffee production to 
numerous low income countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa,() cannot be understated. In 
fact, over 90% of coffee production originates in the south, indicating the importance of 
understanding its role in growth and development (Ponte 2001, 2002). The wide geographic 
spread of coffee production, from Latin America to SSA and increasingly East Asia has 
resulted in intense competition among producers, leading to further price pressures (Maizels, 
Bacon, and Mavrotas 1997). Tanzania’s coffee is exported to a number of countries, with 
Germany, Japan, and Italy making up the majority of this demand. The importance of 
Tanzania as an international coffee producer is negligible, at around 0.7% of world output 
over the last twenty years (ICO 2015b). However, Tanzanian coffee is a particularly 
important substitute producer for other producers of mild Arabica and Robusta coffee. 
Tanzanian coffee is therefore often sought by importers and roasters for these substitute 
characteristics in the creation of blends (Daviron and Ponte 2006).  
Arabica coffee is also a historic central income source for agricultural producers in 
the Kilimanjaro region. Coffee production was introduced by German Roman Catholic 
missionaries in the late 1890s and was initially restricted to settler plantations in favorable 
planting areas surrounding Mount Kilimanjaro. Despite opposition from the settlers and 
plantation owners, coffee cultivation among Chagga peasant cultivators grew (Iliffe 1979). In 
part, the growth of coffee production among peasant producers can be traced to the ease of 
interplanting, especially among existing banana groves but also due to the successful 
establishment of one of the first agricultural producer cooperatives, the Kilimanjaro Native 
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Planters Association (KNPA). The KNPA allowed producers to act as one voice against the 
perceived exploitation by Asian and European middlemen as well as continued lobbying 
against peasant coffee production by European plantation owners (Kimario 1992). Through 
the KNPA and later the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU), producers could 
also begin to address crop disease problems and attempt to access necessary chemicals and 
spraying equipment (Iliffe 1979). Following independence in 1961, the newly formed 
Tanzanian government implemented drastic policies in the agricultural sector. These included 
frequent and varied changes to the role of agricultural cooperatives ending with liberalization 
of the domestic and international trade of coffee in the early 1990s (Ponte 2002, 2004). One 
central aspect that has been largely retained in the Tanzanian case (unlike its East African 
coffee-trading neighbors) is the central coffee auction, which was first introduced in 1952 to 
make the domestically processed coffee available to the international export market. Figure 2 
provides a stylized picture of an Arabica coffee commodity chain that originates in 
Tanzania’s Kilimanjaro region.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Method and Fieldwork Description  
We adopt a case study approach, considering Tanzanian Arabica coffee and trace 
price dynamics from the coffee derivatives markets in New York to Kilimanjaro’s producers 
as they are connected via international traders, Tanzanian traders, middlemen, and other local 
actors whose relations and actions are underpinned by institutional and market structures at 
the local and global level. Our research complements established work on coffee on 
Tanzanian coffee chains (Gibbon and Ponte 2005; Daviron and Ponte 2006). Our approach 
differs in a number of ways in that our focus in on the process of price formation. 
Consequently, our analysis both goes beyond the physical commodity chain to include 
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derivatives markets and key institutions, and extends current thinking at the extreme ends of 
the commodity chain.  
We conducted a series of semistructured interviews with commodity traders, key 
personnel in all of the largest international coffee trading houses in the United States, 
London, and Switzerland. In Tanzania, exporters, cooperative officials, extension workers 
and coffee research organizations, personnel from the Tanzanian Coffee Board, and Auction 
officials were interviewed using semistructured survey instruments. Semistructured 
interviews with primary producers and village-level focus groups were conducted across 
three villages in the Kilimanjaro region. Fieldwork was conducted in 2006–2007, which 
coincided with an important time in terms of price development for coffee and other 
commodities. This period represents an era of relative stability in relation to commodity 
prices in general, and predates the sharp rise and subsequent collapse in commodity prices 
that began in August 2008. The period under scrutiny also represents a period of calm 
following numerous institutional changes in the Tanzanian coffee trading system, which 
allows us to study the longer-term impact of coffee market restructuring in Tanzania. Despite 
being almost ten years ago, institutional structures in the coffee chain have remained, by and 
large, the same so that the conclusions drawn from this research would not substantially 
change if fieldwork were to be repeated today. The case study approach and the use of 
numerous different types and sources of data, allow us to take into account different 
perspectives of actors and institutions. This allows for a more holistic and interpretive 
research process (Creswell 2003). Such fieldwork-based research is directly connected to the 
analytical framework presented in “An analytical framework for a study of price formation 
and transmission in commodity chains,” above. The processes we are uncovering would not 
be revealed by alternative methods such as purely quantitative methods used in many 
economic studies on price transmission. Crucially, the adoption of a variety of qualitative 
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techniques adds meat to the stylized bones of the price chain provided in segment B of Figure 
1, by investigating how prices are formed in the context of global and local institutional 
changes and evolving relationships between actors in the price chain. In turn, such an 
approach then allows us to gain a richer understanding of the implications of price formation 
and transmission for the broader issue of economic development. 
The Tanzanian Coffee Price Chain Reexamined: From World Prices to 
Farm-gates   
The notion of a world price plays a core role in coffee price formation on the ground. 
As a commodity where supply and demand are largely located in different parts of the world, 
the world price is generally understood as reflecting the global supply and demand for coffee. 
As already discussed above, far from the mainstream economic abstract supply and demand 
depiction of markets, markets—including the notional world market—are regulated through 
varying institutional configurations. Changes in the regulation of the world market for coffee 
have also changed the index, or price prosthesis in the lexicon employed by Çalişkan (2010) 
that actors consider as the world price.  
The collapse of the system of target price (or price band) and adjustable export quotas 
under the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1989 marked a watershed in the process 
of coffee price formation and signaled a shift in the balance of power in favor of international 
coffee trading houses vis-à-vis producing country actors
8
 (Daviron and Ponte 2006).  Under 
the ICAs, the ICO monitored prevailing member market prices through the calculation of 
daily indicator prices for each variety of coffee traded based on ex‐dock quotations for 
prompt shipment on the physicals markets in Germany, France, and the United States. Should 
the indicator diverge too much from the target price, quotas were relaxed or tightened 
                                                          
8 The ICA consisted of a series of agreements beginning in 1962 between a group of exporting and importing countries 
aimed at maintaining stable and relatively high prices. 
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accordingly to bring the member market price back to the target range. The ICO system 
established the metric of price measurement as denominated in US dollars per 50kg bag of 
green coffee. From July 1, 1963, until the end of the ICA on July 4, 1989, the ICO indicator 
price served as the established world price to which all coffee trading parties referred in price 
negotiations. Given the relative stability of coffee prices and the relatively strong bargaining 
position of exporters in coffee-producing countries,
9
 international coffee traders’ main 
concern was to secure necessary volumes of green coffee, and,  generally, fixed-price forward 
contracts were utilized.  
The collapse of the ICA signaled the onset of an era of new risks associated with price 
volatility, and the diminishing relevance of the ICO indicator price and its replacement by the 
coffee futures prices evolving on the New York and London exchanges for Arabica and 
Robusta coffee, respectively, as international traders increasingly utilized exchange traded 
hedging instruments to mitigate these risks. The volume of coffee C futures contracts traded 
on the New York Coffee Exchange more than doubled between the signing of the last ICA in 
1983 and its eventual expiry in 1989, and continued to accelerate without a comparable 
increase in global Arabica production.  
Institutional and other financial investors account for much of the increase in coffee 
futures trading and trading on international commodity exchanges, in general, especially 
since 2004. Institutional holdings in commodity futures were estimated to have increased 
from $15 billion in 2003 to over $200 billion in 2008 (Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission 2008). The rise of institutional investors on commodity markets has been 
understood as part of a broader process of financialization as capitalist restructuring in the 
twenty-first century and related to neoliberal policy reforms such as the withdrawal of the 
welfare state in social provisioning, including for old age, with the consequent rise of private 
                                                          
9 Throughout the ICA, exports tended to be channeled through a single state marketing institution in coffee-producing 
countries. 
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pension funds and their quest for new investment vehicles such as commodity indices (Froud, 
Johal, and Williams 2002;  Lapavitsas 2011; UNCTAD 2011; Fine 2012). Rather than solely 
reflecting anticipated supply and demand dynamics on physical markets, the trading activities 
of institutional and other financial investors are informed by wider economic factors and 
conditions on equity markets owing to the role played by commodities in portfolio 
diversification (Domanski and Heath 2007; Mayer 2012; Adams and Glück 2015).  
There is mounting evidence that the financialization of commodity markets has had a 
profound impact on price formation. Tang and Xiong (2012) reported greater comovement 
across futures prices since 2004 for commodities that formed part of commodity index 
instruments, such as the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI), the Dow Jones UBS 
Commodity Index (DJ-UBS), S&P Commodity Index (SPCI), compared with those not 
included. More recently, Basak and Pavlova (forthcoming) estimated that between 11% and 
17% of commodity futures prices is accounted for by financialization, with the rest 
attributable to fundamentals. In the case of coffee, Newman (2009b) discovered a loosening 
of the relationship between coffee futures prices and physical supply and demand after index 
funds entered the market in the early 2000s. In this way the formation of the world price of 
coffee has been affected by the changing character of global capital accumulation and 
contemporary capitalist restructuring to which changes in the accumulation strategies and 
associated corporate restructuring of international coffee traders are attached. 
Export Prices for Tanzanian Coffee  
A major consequence of the shift toward routine hedging by international traders has 
been the promotion of futures prices as the key reference, or technical device, used in the 
process of price negotiation all along the commodity chain, leaving the ICO indicator price 
largely irrelevant in the trade. Far from benign, this shift has fundamentally changed the 
relationship between coffee price dynamics, and consequently the ways in which actors on 
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the ground reconfigure and perform prices. International traders, with headquarters in 
consuming countries, particularly in Europe and the United States, sit between roasters and 
exporters in the vertical organization of the international coffee supply system. The coffee 
industry at the international trader level is highly concentrated, with the top five companies 
accounting for a market share of over 55% (International Trade Centre 2011). As well as the 
large international coffee trading companies, a number of small coffee trading companies 
exist, each accounting for a very small share of world market, often operating in speciality 
and niche markets such as fair trade.   
As a matter of course, the largest of the trade houses hedge all green coffee trades. 
ED&F Man and the Neumann Kaffee Gruppe have their own in-house options and futures 
brokerages in ED&F Man Commodity Advisors Limited and TRX Futures, respectively. 
Smaller traders, particularly those dealing in speciality grades of coffee, either do not hedge 
or will hedge only a proportion of their traded volume. The main reason for this difference in 
the hedging practices of these two types of firms stems from differences in the process of 
coffee trading and pricing for the bulk grades compared with the speciality grades. A coffee 
trader sums up the practice of trading bulk coffee as follows:
 10
 
That’s the first thing you look at, New York and London . . . And a differential 
against the market. On a commercial grade it will be a description, let’s say 
Colombia Excelsior, that grade will sell for between level money (which means the 
same price on New York) to plus 2, plus 2.5. It won’t fluctuate far from that band, 
fob. And so when we’re buying we try and buy at level money and when we’re 
selling we try to sell at plus 2 and that’s our 2 cent margin, and if we can make 2 
cents we’re a very happy trade house. On that sort of commercial grade, that’s the 
                                                          
10 Quotes are taken from interviews with coffee traders in international trading companies conducted in 2007. 
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sort of business it is. And if people aren’t selling at level money then we are not 
buying, pretty much as simple as that. 
Trade in bulk grades are conducted by larger traders. The margins on such trades are 
small, and trading companies derive their incomes from dealing in very large volumes, 
usually supplying the largest multinational coffee roasting companies and sourcing from 
around the world on a continuous basis. 
International trading companies purchase coffee from local exporters, subsidiaries, or 
companies in their trading group located at origin. For coffee from a particular origin, the 
international trader decides on a differential to the international exchange at which it is 
willing to purchase coffee on that day. This differential reflects the difference in quality of 
the contracted coffee compared with minimum quality deliverable on either of the 
international exchanges. The trader then contacts its suppliers with this offer price, and the 
negotiation proceeds based on local market conditions. It is up to the seller to decide to fix 
the price at a particular time. The actual price at which the coffee is exchanged will be the 
futures price at the point of fixing, plus or minus the agreed differential under the so-called 
price-to-be-fixed contract. Since the international trader hedges by offsetting its position in 
physicals with futures contracts, the time at which the price is fixed is of little importance. On 
the other hand, local exporters tend not to be hedged so the time at which they fix can be 
critical. A seller may hold off fixing the price if it expects the futures price to rise further; 
losses are made if the futures price falls below the price at which coffee was purchased.  
The large roasting companies do not purchase commercial grades of coffee on a 
continuous basis but will be in the market at a particular time for a particular grade. For 
example, a roaster will enter the market at some point in order to secure the Central American 
coffees that are needed for the following three to twelve months. The roasting company will 
make the trading companies aware of their needs and invite offers from the various traders. 
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Once again the contract price will be based on a differential of the relevant international 
exchange but with the buyer’s option to fix. The price at which physical coffee of commercial 
grades is bought and sold in international trade is inextricably linked to the price of coffee 
futures contracts on the New York and London exchanges. 
The wholesale use of price-to-be-fixed contracts in the bulk coffee trade at the 
international trader level cements the relationship between the physical and the futures 
markets for coffee. The use of these contracts, as opposed to fixed-price forward contracts—
where the price, volume, and delivery date are determined at the time of signing—means that 
the volatile prices on international exchanges are transmitted more rapidly and fully into the 
prices at which physical coffee is traded. This has implications on the way in which futures 
prices are transmitted from international exchanges, via international traders, upstream along 
individual coffee chains toward the production end of the chain. As another coffee trader 
observed, 
[T]he futures price is the determinant all along the chain. It feeds right down through 
because at any point on any given day there is not going to be anyone who is able to 
put a price that is drastically much higher or lower than anyone who is basing 
themselves on the futures market. . . . This is not so much in the speciality market but 
in the trading in the bulk commodities, it is very much the futures market. 
Moreover, international traders have increasingly integrated futures trading into 
their accumulation strategies. There is evidence that commodity trading houses engage in 
speculative hedging in order to reap financial rewards in addition to the management of 
price risks in the context of increasingly volatile commodity prices (Newman 2009a). 
There is also greater alignment of multinational corporations’(MNC)trading strategies 
with those of financial investors. Physical traders look not only at fundamentals but also 
try to anticipate the factors that determine financial investors’ trading decisions. As one 
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trader interviewed by UNCTAD (2011, 44) put it, “the banks are trying to understand our 
markets and we try to understand their markets.” This has had profound implications on 
the distribution of price risks along coffee chains and the ability of different chain actors 
to profit from financialized accumulation (Newman 2009a). 
The Tanzania Coffee Auction and Domestic Trading Price(s) for Coffee 
In terms of domestic price formation, the Tanzanian coffee marketing system, with its 
parallel cooperative and private marketing channels, and the existence of a central auction, 
reveals some interesting complexities (see Figure 2).   
Leaving, the direct export channels (on the right-hand side of Figure 2) to one side, 
there are four main channels through which smallholder coffee is marketed locally. First 
(marked 1 in Figure 2), the purely private marketing channel consists of private coffee buyers 
(PCBs) purchasing parchment at the farm-gate or at local buying posts. The PCBs deliver the 
parchment coffee to the dry mills for processing at a fee. The coffee is then stored, awaiting 
the next auction. While the ownership of the coffee is transferred to the parchment buyer in 
the private marketing chains, ownership of the coffee remains with the farmers until the 
auction in the three remaining marketing channels.  
Secondly (marked 3 in Figure 2), the traditional cooperative channel is still in 
operation in the Kilimanjaro region. Farmers deposit coffee at the primary society where it is 
inspected and weighed. The farmer is given a first payment for the coffee. The collected 
parchment is transported to the union-owned mill and processed. Once the coffee has been 
auctioned, the farmers receive a second payment for the difference between the auction price 
and the first payment, with costs deducted.  
The remaining two marketing channels (marked 2 and 4 in Figure 2) utilize elements 
of the cooperative marketing system. A number of primary societies have left the unions to 
which they once belonged and have formed alliances with other farmers’ groups to market 
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their coffee. Here, cooperation between the groups is for marketing purposes only (marked 2 
in Figure 2). The final, and most recently introduced, marketing channel is coordinated by 
producer support organizations for direct export, which we will not discuss in detail here 
(marked 4 in Figure 2).
11
  
There are two channels by which coffee is exported from Tanzania, via auction and 
through direct export. The vast majority of coffee exports go through the coffee auction 
(between 60 and 90% over the past ten years, although this can vary dramatically from year 
to year according to Baregu, Barreiro-Hurle, and Maro (2013), where exporters purchase 
graded and bagged green coffee. Here we focus on the auction system as the mediator of 
price transmission for the majority of coffee exports from Tanzania.
 
For a number of 
commentators, “the auction appears to be an efficient pricing mechanism, in the sense that 
realized prices move in accordance with the New York Board of Trade futures prices” 
(Baffes 2005, 35). 
Licensed buyers at the coffee auction include private export companies (dominated by 
subsidiaries of MNC trading companies) and cooperative unions. For the bulk grades of 
coffee, the decision for exporters to purchase coffee at the auction will depend on the sales 
that have been secured and their need to secure coffee to fulfill forward contracts. Since these 
sales will be made at a differential on a price-to-be-fixed contract, the New York and London 
prices determine the price at which the exporter will purchase bulk grades at the auction. Two 
of the four MNC exporters interviewed operated as the buying arms for their groups. Coffee 
sales to roasters are made through the European offices, and the exporter based in Tanzania is 
issued with shipping instructions for these sales.  
The process of purchasing and exporting speciality grades differs from that for bulk 
grades. Exporters are less likely to sell specialty coffee on contracts that are far forward. 
                                                          
11 These are largely funded by external donors, and the organizations deliver programs and services aimed at developing the 
smallholder coffee sector in Tanzania. The projects seek to improve the quality of smallholder coffee and market it 
externally as speciality coffee.  
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Overseas buyers of speciality quality tend to procure coffee on the basis of a sample of the 
coffee that the exporter already has in stock. Speciality coffee exporters, including the 
cooperative union exporters, have closer and more direct ties with their markets. These 
exporters will have a good idea of what their customers are looking for and purchase coffee 
on the auction accordingly. The pricing of speciality coffees also differs from the bulk. 
Speciality coffees tend to sell on a large positive differential to New York. This differential is 
realized on the basis of a sample through analysis and cupping by the exporter and his client. 
Coffee that is destined for the gourmet market may be priced with no consideration for the 
New York price. 
In the 2010–2011 crop year, 60% of mild Arabica coffee sold at auction was made up 
of the premium and speciality (AA, A, and PB) grades.  Since the pricing of these coffees can 
be less dependent on New York, it might be expected that swings in prices on the New York 
market will not be as fully reflected in the auction prices. This would explain the findings by 
Krivonos (2004) that there was a slight reduction in the degree of price transmission between 
world and local coffee prices in Tanzania. In contrast to Krivonos’s own interpretation of this 
finding as a result of the incomplete nature of the coffee market reforms in Tanzania, the 
weakening in the co-integration relationship between world and local coffee prices can be 
interpreted as the consequence of the Tanzania Coffee Board’s strategy to differentiate green 
coffee at the auction and market speciality grades where prices are realized differently.  
The auction system in Tanzania has certain other attributes and performs important 
functions in terms of price transmission and price stabilization that are often overlooked. 
Since 2001 those selling on the auction have to be legally separate from the buyers 
(international exporters) in order to prevent anticompetitive bidding behavior where 
international traders can bid up the price of coffee put up for auction by their local 
subsidiaries. The blind, electronic auction system facilitates this separation, forcing exporters 
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to wait until the auction convenes (twice every month during the buying season) to purchase 
Tanzanian coffee at a price based on its grade. In this way the auction system helps to shield 
those (cooperatives and private domestic traders) further upstream of the supply chain from 
daily price fluctuations. It helps to reduce the amplitude and frequency of sudden price 
changes in international futures markets from being transmitted further up the price chain.   
Farm-gate Prices for Coffee in Kilimanjaro Region  
While the coffee auction discussed above performs an important role in terms of 
information provision and price stabilization, auction prices do not necessarily reflect the 
prices received by producers (see Figure 2). The continued economic viability and 
functioning of the cooperative unions in most regions has allowed these to provide producers 
with a more stable producer price. Producers in the Kilimanjaro region who sell to KNCU, 
therefore, face more stable prices than those selling to private companies. This is due to the 
KNCU’s payment system, which offers producers the opportunity to sell their crops early but 
still retain the potential to benefit from increases in price once the crop has been sold to 
exporters through the auction. Most coffee producers in the Kilimanjaro region have 
completed harvesting and selling their coffee by December, and relative gains from price 
increases will evidently depend on seasonal price developments (however, the general 
tendency has been for prices to increase over the season). Furthermore, prices in the region in 
which KNCU operates are unified across geographic areas. Producers who choose to sell 
their coffee to private companies at village buying posts are unable to benefit from this 
additional payment system and instead receive a one-off, location-dependent price. 
In general therefore, producers selling outside the cooperative system are more 
exposed to unexpected price shifts. However, other factors are also important in determining 
outcomes for producers, including the price of coffee relative to the price of other goods and 
services, including food. As Figure 3 shows, in nominal terms, producer prices initially 
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increased following liberalization in the mid-1990s but subsequently gradually declined over 
time to reach a low in 2001–2002. Since then coffee prices have started to rise again in 
nominal terms. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 A consideration of real producer prices reveals an intensification and asymmetry in 
the way international prices have been passed down to producers. Deflating Arabica coffee 
prices by the Tanzanian consumer price index and comparing them to domestic food prices in 
Figure 4 demonstrates this process. Producers have been particularly hard hit by the dramatic 
real fall in coffee prices over the late 1990s and early 2000s, with prices in 2001–2002 
representing a quarter of prices in 1997–98. At the same time, the stark increase in the 
international coffee price since the early 2000s has not been transmitted in the same way in 
reverse to producers.  
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Price instability in the season was predominantly a concern for those marketing their 
coffee outside the cooperative system. As a result, roughly half of those interviewed were not 
aware of particular patterns or instability of prices over the season and had made no attempt 
at managing this or timing the sale of their crop. Producers selling to private buyers were 
more aware of increased in-season volatility over recent years and the general pattern of 
rising prices as the season progresses. Table 1 reports prices received by producers in the 
2006–2007 season across the three villages investigated. Reported producer prices were 
diverse, depending on which statistics are considered. Furthermore, the prices received by 
producers varied between and within villages. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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Differences in the average prices received by producers for their coffee are stark. On 
average, producers in Kiruweni village obtained a higher price for their coffee in 2006–2007 
when compared with the other two villages. However, the spread of prices was also greater in 
Kiruweni village when compared with the other two villages. The above picture regarding 
prices in 2006–2007 is also reflected in the longer-term view of prices at the village level, 
where producers in Kiruweni reported a slightly more positive view of price developments. 
Wanri and Narumu villages, on the other hand, displayed a particularly negative view of price 
developments over recent years.  
The above considerations suggest that coffee producers in the Kilimanjaro region 
have been exposed to considerable real price erosion since the mid-1990s, although the exact 
impacts have been diverse. When international and export prices have fallen, producers have 
borne the brunt of the impact in both real and nominal terms. When prices have risen, 
producers in general have, however, not benefitted proportionally, largely due to the 
concurrent increases in the cost of inputs and food.
12
 Given the earlier discussion regarding 
the role of the auction in Tanzania, one can speculate that a counterfactual situation in which 
no auction system exists would expose Tanzanian coffee producers even further to the above 
problems. The results also suggest that producers marketing their coffee via the local 
cooperative union are better protected from price falls than those selling to private traders.   
 
Conclusion: Price Formation and Development 
This article has examined the nature of price formation and transmission in the 
Tanzanian coffee price chain. It has investigated how prices are formed in different segments 
of the chain and how they are transmitted between different segments of the price chain, 
                                                          
12 Consumer prices for inputs and food have risen for a number of reasons in Tanzania. One can associate the price increases 
with changes in global prices from the mid-2000s to 2013, particularly the increase in the oil price, which has fed into the 
costs of production (Ghosh 2010). The rise in input prices is also a result of changes to the domestic sale and pricing, with 
liberalization resulting in fewer subsidized inputs available to producers (Bargawi 2015).  
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down to the level of Tanzanian coffee farmers. The article presented a new framework for the 
study of prices that has helped to demonstrate how prices, are in reality, formed and 
transmitted. By bringing together relational and institutional perspectives to bear on existing 
approaches, the article develops the field of chain studies. Economic geographers have only 
recently begun to expand their field of enquiry into prices, price formation, and pricing 
behavior. This has been a vast improvement on the historic and socially detached theories of 
price transmission conducted by mainstream economists. While the research among 
economic geographers on prices is to be commended, some gaps remain. This becomes 
evident when price is put at the center of the analysis, as in this study. Rather than focusing 
on particular relationships or specific institutions as a starting point, this study tackles prices 
and price transmission as a vehicle through which to understand how the global is transmitted 
to the local. In particular, our focus on the processes of price formation, their institutional 
embeddedness, and their social–spatial dynamics sheds new light on both the nature of the 
networked relations in commodity systems as well as their implications for the geographic 
distribution value and (uneven) economic development. This framework is not unique to the 
study of coffee in Tanzania. Instead it is hoped that other researchers are able to borrow from 
this new analytical framework and apply it in other contexts and to other commodities to 
similarly gain greater insights into real price formation and transmission and, ultimately, 
development.  
In the context of coffee and Tanzania, three main points can be drawn from our 
analysis. First, there has been a dislocation between movements in coffee futures prices and 
changes in physical supply and demand conditions, owing to increased financialization and 
the rise of commodities as an asset class in portfolio investment. Second, the way in which 
prices are transmitted from the world level to coffee producers depends crucially on the 
structure of the domestic marketing system. The auction system in Tanzania has cushioned 
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the transmission of daily international price movements to domestic traders and cooperative 
unions. Finally, these domestic institutional changes have led to a differentiation in price 
transmission and impact. In the Kilimanjaro region, producers linked to the KNCU 
cooperative system are generally more protected from in-season price changes. While 
producers selling to private agents are more exposed to price shifts.   
Given the findings of this research, it is important to assess the implications for 
economic development in Tanzania, particularly since prices have become the locus of a 
great deal of policy attention. Increasingly, this has come in the form of research on price 
instability and attempts to rectify such volatility via the use of risk-management mechanisms 
by commodity producers on the ground. This article has demonstrated the limits of such a 
policy focus. Instead, the allied forces of domestic institutional change and international price 
formation need to be appreciated in order to understand how prices are transmitted to 
producers.  
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Figure 1. An institutional and relational framework for assessing commodity price. 
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Figure 2. Local marketing system for smallholder coffee in Tanzania. 
  
  
Small holders   
  
   
  
Dry Mill s   
Primary  
Societies /   
Farmers  
Groups   
Private  
Coffee  
Buyers   
Auction   
Cooperative  
Union s   
Nonunion 
Farmers 
Group 
Alliances, for 
example, G32 
 
  
  
Producer 
Support 
Organizations, 
for example, 
Kilicafe 
 
Private  
Coffee  
Traders   
Farmers  
Groups   
Home-processed parchment   
Coffee cherries   
P rivate  marketing channel   
Direct Export   
Central 
Pulping 
Units 
EG_ Bargawi   42 
 
 
Figure 3: Nominal Arabica coffee prices in US$ per kg. 
Sources: ICO Indicator Price for Mild Arabica are taken from http://www.ico.org (1995/96–2012/13); export and auction 
prices were obtained from the Tanzania Coffee Board; KNCU producer prices are taken from the basic KNCU price offered 
to producers prior to receipt of final payment. Exchange rate: International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics, 
official rate at end of period—national currency per US$. 
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Figure 4. Real coffee producer prices (1995/96–2009/10).  
Sources: The real coffee price is calculated using the producer price (KNCU  in Tanzanian shillings/kilograms (Tsh/kg) 
1995/96–2009/10) divided by the national consumer price index (World Development Indicators using 1999/2000 as a 
deflator). The relative prices are given by the nominal price in TSh/kg divided by the sum of the nominal average wholesale 
prices of maize and rice (FAO 2013). 
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Table 1 
Nominal Average Prices per Kilogram of Mild Arabica Coffee in Tanzanian Shillings in 
2006–2007 
 
 Village 
Auction 
Price:  
National 
Level 
Producer 
Price: KNCU 
Price 
(Including 
Second 
Payment) 
Producer 
Price: District 
Level 
Reported 
Price 
Average 
Producer 
Price: 
From 
Interviews 
Spread (St. 
Dev.) of Prices 
in Villages: 
From 
Interviews  
Kiruweni 2750 1500 1500 1800         358 
Narumu 2750 1500 1700 1200 105 
Wanri 2750 1500 1700 1400  82 
 
